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Abstract 
 
Economic uncertainty has been posited as an important contributor to low fertility in 
many European countries. A separate line of research emphasizes the role of gender 
inequality in depressing post-industrial fertility. This paper examines how these two forces 
interact in the context of Spain, a society where young adults face tremendous economic 
uncertainty yet simultaneously express gender-role attitudes that are much more egalitarian 
than those of the prior generation. We draw on original in-depth interviews to analyse how 
the reasoning about fertility intentions among young highly-educated partnered urban men 
and women in Spain is conditioned by the combination of gender egalitarianism and 
perceived economic insecurity. Interviewees’ narratives suggest that the positive 
relationship between gender egalitarianism and fertility intentions hypothesized by many 
social demographers is hampered by couples’ challenges in dealing with the uncertain 
economic environment, Spain’s dualistic labour market, and the low level of institutional 
support for dual-earner couples. 
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Introduction  
Very low fertility rates characterize a large number of post-industrial countries in Europe 
and East Asia (Kohler et al. 2002; Billari and Kohler 2004; Goldstein et al. 2009). 
Economic uncertainty has been posited to be a major driver of low fertility in Europe, and 
an extensive literature has examined the relationship between macro-economic instability 
and total fertility rates (Tölke and Diewald 2003; Mills et al. 2005; Sobotka et al. 2011; 
Kreyenfeld et al. 2012; Vignoli et al. 2012; Örsal and Goldstein 2018). More recently, 
many social demographers have adopted a micro-level perspective and have analysed the 
relationship between economic uncertainty and fertility at the couple level (Özcan et al. 
2010; Kreyenfeld et al. 2012; Testa and Basten 2014). But while the number of such studies 
has increased, results are often contradictory across different countries or across social 
groups (e.g. by educational level) in the same country (Özcan et al. 2010; Sobotka et al. 
2011; Kreyenfeld et al. 2012; Raymo and Shibata 2017). Indeed, as Sobotka et al. (2011, 
pp. 267) point out, ‘Individual fertility decisions at times of economic recession will often 
be differentiated by sex, age (or stage in the life cycle), ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and 
current family size.’ Understanding the patterning of the economic insecurity-fertility 
relationship across social groups, including the sexes, in different countries thus remains a 
key agenda for social demographers studying low-fertility societies.  
The negative effect of male unemployment on family formation has been generally 
assumed in the fertility literature for many decades. As female labour force participation 
has increased and a dual-earner model has become more widely accepted in many post-
industrial societies, social demographers have turned their attention to the relationship 
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between women’s unemployment and fertility as well (Kreyenfeld et al. 2012). Despite this 
addition of gender to the literature on economic uncertainty and fertility, however, little 
attention has been paid to how a couple’s gender egalitarianism may condition the relative 
impact of men’s and women’s perceived employment insecurity on fertility plans. This 
paper addresses this issue in urban Spain, a context characterized by high economic 
uncertainty and increasingly egalitarian gender-role attitudes and behaviours. We pose 
three questions, one of which is descriptive and two of which are based on theoretical 
considerations. 
First, how strongly do highly-educated partnered young adults in Spain factor the 
perception of economic insecurity into their reasoning behind fertility decisions? Second, is 
economic insecurity considered less of an obstacle to fertility among more gender-
egalitarian couples, given that they prioritize both men’s and women’s wage-earning 
capability and may thus consider income as less “gendered” than less egalitarian couples? 
Third, is gender equity theory’s expectation (McDonald 2000, 2006, 2013) that more 
gender-egalitarian couples are likely to have higher fertility intentions borne out in a 
context of high economic uncertainty such as Spain? We utilize a qualitative approach, 
drawing on original in-depth interviews with young highly-educated partnered adults in 
Madrid and Barcelona to ascertain the reasoning they express for their intentions.  
We consider Spain to be a highly appropriate case for our theoretical purposes. 
Along with Italy, Spain was the first country to have a total fertility rate below 1.3, marking 
it as a “lowest-low fertility” country in the early 1990s. Spain has experienced a high level 
of economic uncertainty since the 1980s, especially among the young working-age 
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population. Spanish unemployment rates have exceeded those in other European countries 
for most of the past three decades, and the economic circumstances of young Spanish adults 
at all education levels have been severely impacted by the restructuring of employment 
away from stable jobs towards short-term contract work (Adserà 2011a; Arpino and 
Tavares 2013). Accordingly, it is well-recognized that economic insecurity is a major driver 
of very low fertility rates in Spain (Ahn and Mira 2001; Simó Noguera et al. 2002; De La 
Rica and Iza 2005; Adserà 2011b).  
At the same time, Spain is an unusual case among Southern European societies in 
terms of the rapid change it has experienced in gender-role attitudes and behaviours 
(Arpino and Tavares 2013; Sullivan et al. 2014; Arpino et al. 2015). McDonald and others 
(McDonald 2000, 2006, 2013; Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Goldscheider et al. 2015; 
Brinton and Lee 2016) have posited that post-industrial societies with very low fertility 
tend to be characterized by inegalitarian gender-role attitudes and behaviors. But Spain 
does not easily fit this profile. Instead, Spanish gender-role attitudes are now considerably 
more egalitarian than those of other very low-fertility countries such as Italy and Japan 
(Arpino and Tavares 2013; Brinton and Lee 2016; Knight and Brinton 2017). Arpino and 
Tavares (2013) found that the propensity for having a positive attitude towards gender 
equity in the household has increased so rapidly in Madrid, for example, that it now 
exceeds the mean for Europe overall. Does gender egalitarianism in Spain exert the positive 
effect on couples’ fertility intentions assumed by gender equity theory, and is it therefore 
perhaps serving as a counteracting force against the pervasive climate of economic 
uncertainty? If the Spanish economy improves, will this burgeoning egalitarianism lead to a 
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rebound in fertility? While we cannot presume to answer these questions, we highlight 
them as the central concerns motivating our analysis. 
Gender inequality and fertility 
Gender equity theory (McDonald 2000) highlights the centrality of gender relations for 
post-industrial fertility change, positing that with women’s increased labour market 
opportunities, fertility is likely to be low unless gender equity increases. McDonald predicts 
that in the absence of greater participation by men in housework and childcare and greater 
institutional support for childrearing, the dual demands placed on women by the household 
and labour market are likely to depress fertility. Researchers have posited a link between 
men’s increasing participation in housework in low-fertility countries and a slight uptick in 
total fertility in these countries in the 2000s (Sullivan et al. 2014). At the micro-level, 
quantitative studies have examined the relationship between the household division of 
labour and fertility (see for example Oláh 2003; Cooke 2004, 2009; Torr and Short 2004; 
Bernhardt and Goldscheider 2006; Puur et al. 2008; Mills 2010; Nagase and Brinton 2017), 
and many of these studies report a positive relationship between men’s contribution to 
household labour and fertility intentions or transition to second birth.  
Does the posited relationship between fertility and gender egalitarianism exist 
independently of the economic environment within which couples find themselves and, 
more specifically, independently of couples’ own perceived economic insecurity? This is a 
very important question for a case such as Spain, where gender egalitarian attitudes have 
spread rapidly but where economic uncertainty and job instability have been high. In order 
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to develop our expectations, we briefly consider the literature on economic insecurity and 
fertility and consider the key institutional features of the macro-level context in Spain that 
are relevant for fertility.  
Economic insecurity and fertility 
After focusing mainly on the link between men’s employment and family formation, social 
demographers have recently examined the relationship between women’s employment 
circumstances and fertility as well. This has become particularly important in the post-
industrial world given the universal increase in women’s educational attainment. Recent 
literature suggests that while economic insecurity among less-educated women is 
frequently associated with a more rapid transition to childbearing (Sobotka et al. 2011), it is 
often linked to childbearing postponement among highly-educated women (Schmitt 2008; 
Kreyenfeld 2010). Consistent with opportunity cost theory, the higher a woman’s current or 
potential salary, the greater the likelihood that she will delay motherhood, although many 
women subsequently “catch up” with second and third births (Rondinelli et al. 2010).  
In terms of linking together gender equity theory and the economic insecurity 
literature on fertility, there is a key unaddressed issue: Looking at the sex-specific link 
between economic insecurity and fertility, as researchers have typically done, obscures the 
couple-level dynamics highlighted by gender equity theory. The economic insecurity 
literature does not directly speak to the issue of how both partners’ employment status—
and the meaning men and women attribute to it—influence fertility. For instance, while it is 
certainly important to investigate the different effect economic insecurity may have on the 
fertility of less- vs. highly-educated women, this neglects the influence that gender-
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egalitarian norms and institutions as well as couple-level egalitarianism have on fertility. 
As Raymo and Shibata (2017, p. 202) point out, ‘The tendency either to focus on men or 
women separately…or to consider economic circumstances at the household level…may 
obscure insights about how fertility is associated differently with the employment 
circumstances of men and women as well as how those gender-specific relationships may 
be shaped by social and economic context.’ For example, the finding in some countries that 
highly-educated women’s employment prospects are relevant for fertility could be due to 
the importance of opportunity costs and/or also due to the fact that highly-educated couples 
tend to be more egalitarian and to privilege women’s career and income more than less-
educated couples do.  
We address these issues for the case of Spain by comparing the discourse on fertility 
intentions and obstacles employed by highly-educated partnered young adults who are 
more vs. less gender-egalitarian. We control for educational level by sampling only the 
highly-educated. We then consider whether a couple’s egalitarianism seems to “cushion” 
them from feeling that economic insecurity is an obstacle to their fertility intentions, and 
whether they consequently have higher fertility intentions than less egalitarian couples.  
Besides egalitarianism, features of the macro-level context such as labour market 
structure and state support for dual-earner couples also may influence how couples think 
about the implications of their economic insecurity and about women’s job instability in 
particular. We turn now to these institutional forces within the context of Spanish society. 
Labour market structure  
“This is an original manuscript / preprint of an article published by Taylor & Francis in: Bueno, X. 
and Brinton, M.C. (2019): Gender egalitarianism, perceived economic insecurity, and fertility 
intentions in Spain: A qualitative analysis, Population Studies, 73(2): 247-260. 17 may 2019, 
available online: https://doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2019.1604979 
 
8 
 
Spain is characterized by an “insider-outsider” labour market with many temporary short-
term jobs and fewer jobs with stable employment contracts (Adserà 2011a). Reforms since 
the mid-1980s have exacerbated this insider-outsider structure and have resulted in an 
expanded number of fixed-term contract jobs. Survey data show that while 90 percent of 
employees in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, and Ireland are not worried about losing their 
jobs, this applies to only 55 percent of employees in Spain (Hipp 2016). Empirical studies 
in Spain find a strong effect of job insecurity on family formation delays (Ahn and Mira 
2001; Simó Noguera et al. 2002; De la Rica and Iza 2005), postponement of second birth, 
and an increased gap between desired and actual fertility (Adserà 2004, 2006, 2011a, b; 
Castro-Martin and Martin-Garcia 2013; Castro-Martín and Seiz 2014). Consistent with 
these findings, in their analysis of the realization of short-term fertility intentions in 22 
European countries Harknett and Hartnett (2014) find that Spain has one of the lowest rates 
of correspondence between fertility intentions and achieved births three years later. 
In societies with an insider-outsider labour market structure, the sex-specific effect 
of job insecurity on fertility prospects is likely to depend on the strength or weakness of the 
male-breadwinner model of the family. Japan, for instance, shares a total fertility rate very 
similar to Spain’s and a dual (insider-outsider) labour market structure, but has a gender-
role ideology that is much more supportive of a male-breadwinner model (Brinton et al. 
forthcoming). Raymo and Shibata (2017) find that the negative effect of economic 
recession on Japanese fertility after 1990 operated through young adult males’ increased 
propensity to hold temporary jobs; they estimate that the impact of this negative effect 
would have been much larger had the decline in stable employment not exerted upward 
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pressure on fertility through married women’s reduced prospects for “good” jobs 
(accentuating a substitution effect). The effect of economic insecurity on fertility may be 
less sex-specific in Spain, given much greater ideological support for dual-earner couples 
and the near taken-for-grantedness that women, especially the highly-educated, will work. 
Couples who are particularly egalitarian may have a higher proclivity to prioritize both the 
male and female partner’s job stability. We propose two contrasting expectations for the 
relationship between perceived economic insecurity and fertility reasoning relative to 
couples’ egalitarianism:  
1a) More gender-egalitarian couples who perceive economic insecurity to be 
an obstacle to fertility will have higher fertility intentions than less  
egalitarian couples, as they will feel that the attainment of job stability 
for either the male or female partner will lower the economic barrier to 
childbearing decisions. In this way, these economically insecure egalitarian  
couples may approach childbearing decisions with greater confidence  
and flexibility than economically insecure couples who are less egalitarian.  
This expectation would be consistent with gender equity theory. 
A contrasting expectation would be:  
1b) More gender-egalitarian couples who perceive economic insecurity as 
an obstacle to fertility will have lower fertility intentions than less  
egalitarian couples, as they will prioritize the attainment of job stability  
for both the male and female partner before proceeding with childbearing 
decisions. Childbearing will be delayed until both partners become  
established in the labour market. At that point, the provision of two  
incomes may facilitate higher fertility intentions and a more rapid  
progression to first and second births. In this sense, egalitarianism  
may “cut both ways” in economically insecure situations. 
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State support for dual-earner couples 
Some scholars suggest that highly-educated women’s propensity to delay childbearing is 
related to the structure of state support such as childcare leave. In welfare states such as 
Sweden, for example, parental leave and the right to return to a job at the same level are 
guaranteed to employees with permanent contracts but not necessarily to those with 
temporary contracts. This can lead highly-educated women in particular to wish to delay 
childbearing until they secure a job with a permanent contract (Brinton et al. forthcoming). 
The Swedish gender-equal parental leave allowance—80 percent of income prior to 
childbirth—also incentivizes men and women to obtain well-paying jobs before having 
children (Andersson 2008). In Spain, Adserà (2006) finds that women working in the 
public sector are less likely than those in the private sector to have a fertility ideals-
intentions gap. She traces this to the fact that women in the public sector have greater job 
stability and more benefits than women in the private sector, especially those in temporary-
contract jobs. Moreover, parental leave policies are more universally upheld in the Spanish 
public sector than the private sector (Meil et al. 2008). 
Under Spanish law new mothers are entitle to 16 weeks of paid maternity leave and 
fathers are entitled to four weeks of paid leave (two weeks at the time of our interviews in 
2012). Maternity and paternity leave are supplemented by unpaid childcare leave that can 
be taken by the mother or the father. Childcare leave is generous in terms of length; full-
time leave can be taken until a child is three years old and part-time leave can be taken until 
a child is twelve years old (up to eight years old at the time of our 2012 interviews). Leave 
policy is not restricted to employees with permanent contracts. But because it is unpaid, 
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leave usage depends heavily on the ability of a couple to afford a temporary reduction in 
one or both partners’ work hours. Spanish women are much more likely than men to use 
unpaid parental leave, with only five of every 100 leave-takers being men (Lapuerta et al. 
2011). Parents’ difficulties in balancing work and family, especially during children’s early 
years (up to age three), are aggravated by a shortage of public daycare spaces. Baizán 
(2009) finds that regional daycare shortages in Spain are negatively related to aggregate 
fertility. Public spending on family-related services as a percent of GDP has been low in 
Spain (Adserà 2004).  
In sum, Spain has a relatively undeveloped welfare state (Esping-Andersen 1999; 
Flaquer 2004) that makes it necessary for many couples to rely on themselves or on 
additional family members to care for children (Tobío 2001). Given that Spanish childcare 
leave policy allows access to unpaid leave through a reduction in work hours, we expect 
that egalitarian couples who can afford to do so will express some flexibility in men’s as 
well as women’s willingness to temporarily reduce their work hours in order to care for 
children. This should have a positive influence on fertility, but it presumes job stability and 
a feeling of economic security. Among economically secure couples who are less 
egalitarian, it is likely that male partners will be less willing to adjust their work schedules 
to devote more time to childrearing. This leads to the following expectation: 
2) Among couples who do not perceive economic insecurity to be 
an obstacle to fertility, more gender-egalitarian couples will express  
greater flexibility in partners’ willingness to adjust work hours to  
share childcare responsibilities. On balance, this should encourage  
higher fertility intentions. 
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After briefly summarizing recent demographic and economic trends in Spain, we turn to 
our interview data and findings. 
Demographic and economic trends in Spain 
Spain has experienced dramatic social change in the past four decades, especially in 
women’s lives. The rate of female advancement to higher education increased from 22 to 
46 percent between 1992 and 2011 for the cohort age 25–34 years (OECD Stats). While 
Spanish women’s overall labour force participation rate remains lower than in many other 
European countries, the rate for younger women is comparable to other countries.  
Changes in Spanish family formation patterns have also been dramatic. Within 
Europe, Spain has experienced one of the most rapid increases in cohabitation and in 
childbearing within cohabitation (Dominguez-Folgueras and Castro-Martin 2013; Esping-
Andersen 2013; Castro-Martín and Seiz 2014). Other changes include increased rates of 
separation and divorce, the spread of same-sex marriages, extensive use of contraceptive 
methods, and changing perceptions of single motherhood. Spain has therefore undergone 
many of the societal changes associated with the second demographic transition 
(Lesthaeghe 1995). Age at first birth has also increased substantially (from 25.2 years in 
1975 to 31.5 in 2013), prompting scholars to label childbearing in Spain (together with 
Italy) the “latest-late” in the world (Billari and Kohler 2004).  
Birth register data from 2011 indicate that highly-educated native-born women in 
Spain experience their first birth after age 33 on average, compared to age 28 for the least-
educated women. Highly-educated women who have a second child do so within a shorter 
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time period than women with less education; the average birth interval between first and 
second child was 3.5, 4.4, and 5.1 years for tertiary-, secondary-, and primary-educated 
women respectively during 2007-2013. In couples where both partners are university-
educated, the birth interval is even shorter (3.3 years). This is consistent with previous 
literature for a number of European countries (Kravdal and Rindfuss 2008; Andersson et al. 
2009). Even so, average completed fertility is slightly lower for highly-educated Spanish 
women (1.6 children) than for women with secondary or primary education (1.7 and 1.9, 
respectively; Fertility and Values Survey 2006).  
Turning to the economic context, Spanish unemployment rates have been high for 
decades even when compared to other Southern European countries. Figure 1 shows the 
unemployment rate for 25–34 year-olds in a number of European countries since 1970. 
Spain’s rate was by far the highest in the 1980s and 1990s, skyrocketing once more with 
the European economic crisis of 2008. Figure 2 demonstrates that high unemployment 
extends even to young people with tertiary education. While not shown here, 
unemployment rates for Spanish men and women are similar, with the female rate 
exceeding men’s in some age groups. 
----- Figures 1, 2 about here ----- 
Data and methods  
Data 
We use original in-depth interviews conducted in 2012 to examine how highly-educated 
partnered young Spanish adults formulate their fertility ideals, intentions, and reasoning. 
“This is an original manuscript / preprint of an article published by Taylor & Francis in: Bueno, X. 
and Brinton, M.C. (2019): Gender egalitarianism, perceived economic insecurity, and fertility 
intentions in Spain: A qualitative analysis, Population Studies, 73(2): 247-260. 17 may 2019, 
available online: https://doi.org/10.1080/00324728.2019.1604979 
 
14 
 
While the use of qualitative methods is less common than survey research methods in 
demography, structured in-depth interviews are a highly effective tool to explore how 
individuals express their reasoning (Randall and Koppenhaver 2004).  
Our sample consists of 53 highly-educated, heterosexual, native-born, urban men 
and women age 24–35 in stable cohabiting partnerships or marriage. We stratified the 
sample so that half of the interviewees are childless and half have one child. Equal numbers 
of men and women were sampled separately, so that no individuals in our data set are in 
unions with each other. We define higher education as the completion of tertiary education 
(university or post-secondary vocational school). In addition, we restrict the sample to 
individuals who are not full-time students, are neither pregnant nor have a pregnant partner, 
do not have children from a previous relationship, and who are not separated, divorced, or 
widowed. Samples are drawn evenly from Madrid and Barcelona, Spain’s two largest urban 
centres.  
Interviewee recruitment was done through snowball sampling, starting with a large 
number of individual “seeds” who each referred up to two potential interviewees. We 
repeated this process until all the cells in our sampling frame were filled. A disadvantage of 
snowball sampling is the potential existence of clusters in the final sample due to the small 
number of initial seeds and the limited network dispersion of referral chains. To address this 
concern, we performed post-hoc cluster analysis (using both single-link and median-link 
methods) to identify potential clusters within our sample. We based this analysis on 
interviewees’ responses to eleven World Values Survey questions included in our interview 
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protocol. The absence of a hierarchical structure indicates that there is no clustering of 
particular “types” of like-minded individuals within the sample. 
 Both sampling and interviewing were carried out by the first author, trained as a 
sociologist and demographer. A strength of the study is the shared status between 
interviewees and interviewer (a highly-educated, native-born Spanish female in the same 
age range as the interviewees), which enhanced trust and made it easy to establish rapport. 
Interviews were conducted face-to-face in Spanish in cafes or interviewees’ homes, with no 
family members present. The typical interview lasted 60 to 120 minutes. Interviews were 
voice-recorded and later transcribed in Spanish by a native speaker.  
Interview questions 
A structured interview protocol was used. The protocol included questions about current or 
most recent employment of the interviewee and his/her partner; fertility ideals, intentions, 
and reasoning; household division of labour and childcare; gender-role attitudes; and views 
on work-family policies and low-fertility policies in Spain. The interviewer also recorded 
biographical and financial information for each interviewee. In this paper we draw 
primarily on individuals’ answers to questions related to the reasoning for fertility ideals 
and intentions and the gap between them, if any; perceived conditions or obstacles in the 
decision-making process; and anticipated timing for having a child. 
Coding process 
Coding was done in several stages. We first established structural codes to demarcate 
topical sections of the interview. We then inductively coded interviewees’ reasons for 
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fertility ideals, intentions, and the ideals-intentions gap. Coding was done using the 
qualitative software Dedoose. We also wrote detailed memos describing each individual’s 
fertility reasoning, putting it in the context of couple-level characteristics (age, education, 
and employment of interviewees and their partners, as well as gendered household 
dynamics).  
Because we aim to analyse how perceived economic insecurity and gender 
egalitarianism influence fertility plans, we follow Kravdal (2002), Bernardi et al. (2008), 
and Hipp (2016) and measure individuals’ subjective economic insecurity. Given our focus 
on the link with fertility, we code whether individuals mention economic insecurity as an 
obstacle to achieving their fertility ideals or to having a child (whether first or second 
child). If they do not, we code them as not expressing this concern. Our qualitative data 
provide much texture in terms of individuals’ reasoning about economic insecurity as an 
obstacle to fertility plans or not. For example, a number of interviewees belong to couples 
with at least one unemployed partner. But they do not uniformly voice a sense of economic 
insecurity in relation to fertility plans; some of them are professionally prepared, have work 
experience, and feel confident in finding a job. Some also mention receiving unemployment 
benefits and state that their household income has barely been affected by unemployment. 
Under such circumstances, they may not perceive economic insecurity as an obstacle to 
fertility plans. 
We also categorized interviewees based on their description of the gender-role 
dynamics with their partner. To do so, we considered how they describe dividing household 
labour and how they answered three additional questions. The first was how they and their 
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partner share or plan to share childcare responsibilities. Second, we considered 
interviewees’ intention to take childcare leave at the birth of their first/second child, 
including their past use of leave (in the case of one-child interviewees). Finally, we 
considered whether they feel the mother should be the primary caregiver when a child is 
under three years old. Based on the consistency across these gender-role behaviours and 
attitudes, we categorized interviewees as being in more egalitarian or less egalitarian 
couples. We note in passing that none of the female interviewees expressed the desire to be 
stay-at-home wives and mothers, nor did any male interviewees express the desire or 
expectation that their partner do so. Instead, interviewees assumed that the female partner 
in the couple would be in the labour force. In only a few cases did interviewees anticipate 
that the woman would take full-time leave for one to three years or be non-employed for a 
short period of time. This feature of our data is consistent with the literature on Spain, 
contrasting sharply with East Asian low-fertility cases such as Japan (Brinton and Oh 
2017), where it is more common for highly-educated women to exit the labour force for an 
extended number of years while childrearing.  
Interviewees in the more gender-egalitarian group describe being in a couple where 
housework (and childcare, in the case of interviewees with one child) is more or less 
equally shared. They tend to express either disinterest in taking childcare leave (especially 
because it is unpaid) or to say that both partners are interested in reducing their working 
hours after childbirth. We term this “part-time leave.” Members of these couples mostly 
disagree with the statement that a mother should focus on childcare during the first three 
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years of a child’s life, with many expressing the viewpoint that both the mother and the 
father should do so.  
Interviewees in less egalitarian couples describe a more gendered household 
division of labour and a heavier housework and childcare share for the female partner. In 
this group, men generally do not intend to take childcare leave. Their partners typically plan 
to take full-time leave or reduce their work hours once a child is born. These interviewees 
tend to favour the mother as the primary caregiver while the child is very young, contingent 
upon financial circumstances.  
We recognize the possible limitations in our categorization of interviewees into 
more vs. less gender-egalitarian couples. Our interview data suggest that men may 
overestimate their housework contribution, an observation noted in the household division 
of labour literature (Kamo 2000). Among interviewees we categorize as being in less 
egalitarian couples, 13 are female and only 7 are male. Conversely, 19 of the interviewees 
we classified as being in more gender egalitarian couples are male and fewer (14) are 
female. This makes it all the more important to consider gender egalitarianism in couples as 
multidimensional, encompassing not just the household division of labour but also attitudes 
towards the mother as the primary caregiver and men’s and women’s intention to use 
childcare leave or cut back their working hours. Taking into account all of these factors 
gives us greater confidence in our categorization. 
Results 
Our first research question is descriptive: How much do highly-educated partnered young 
Spanish interviewees discuss economic insecurity as an obstacle to their fertility goals?  
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Evidence of the effect of economic insecurity on fertility reasoning is abundantly 
clear in our data: the majority of sampled individuals (29 out of 53) spontaneously mention 
it as a reason motivating their fertility plans. Childless and one-child interviewees are 
evenly represented in this group.  
Mercedes, for example, is a 29-year-old childless female working full-time as an 
administrative assistant. Her partner is a 31-year-old draftsman who works full-time. 
Mercedes’ fertility ideal is three children but she thinks she will probably have two. She 
states: ‘Many times I have imagined myself having a family, but right now I have my feet 
on the ground and am feeling realistic and no, I don’t presently have the chance to have a 
family.’ When subsequently asked about the obstacles she perceives, she replies 
emphatically, ‘Economic… employment…the economy of the country! Even though the 
price of housing has dropped, it is still sky-high, and employment conditions are worse.’ 
She feels that in order to have children, the couple’s employment conditions and income 
need to improve.   
Tomás is another example. He is a 33-year-old father of one child who works part-
time in a community center and whose partner (29 years old) works full-time as a pre-
school teacher. Their daughter is one and a half years old, and they would like to have two 
kids. Tomás explains that even though they were not economically stable, they didn’t want 
to forego having children so they went ahead and had their daughter. He says, ‘It is fine, but 
now [for the second child], well, our apartment is small….’ When asked whether they 
intend to have a second child in the next three years, he replies: ‘As of today, no. [If we 
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have a second child] we need to be able to move to a different apartment, and this is 
directly linked to having a higher income.’  
In addition to finding much evidence of Spain’s uncertain economic situation in our 
interviews, we also find consistency with the literature on Spain’s increasingly gender-
egalitarian context: More interviewees (N=33) are in couples we characterize as gender-
egalitarian and fewer (N=20) are in couples that are less gender-egalitarian.  
We turn now to our two theoretical questions concerning the intersection of gender 
egalitarianism and economic insecurity in relation to fertility goals. Do we see evidence 
that the gender egalitarianism of a couple “buffers” their perception that economic 
insecurity will hamper their fertility plans? And does gender egalitarianism facilitate higher 
fertility intentions for economically insecure and secure couples alike?  
Among interviewees who do not cite economic insecurity as a concern for fertility 
plans (N=24), we indeed find that many more are in gender-egalitarian couples (N=17) than 
in less egalitarian couples (N=7). Interviewees who express concern over economic 
insecurity, on the other hand, are equally divided between more and less gender-egalitarian 
couples (N=16 and N=13, respectively). Thus there seems to be a lesser tendency for the 
more egalitarian couples in our data to express economic insecurity as a barrier to fertility 
goals compared to less egalitarian couples. This is what we anticipated.  
As to whether egalitarianism cushions the negative effect of economic insecurity on 
fertility intentions, our interview data suggest a more complex answer that was presaged in 
our earlier discussion of what it means for couples to prioritize women’s as well as men’s 
job security. We first note that about half of our entire sample state an intention to have two 
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children; if we also include those who say “one or two” or “two or three,” this becomes the 
majority of interviewees (40 out of 53). This is consistent with the “two-child norm” for 
fertility intentions in Europe (Sobotka and Beaujouan 2014). But when we divide more 
egalitarian interviewees into those who express economic insecurity and those who do not, 
we find some differences in their fertility intentions. Interviewees who perceive economic 
insecurity seem particularly inclined to limit their fertility intentions to “one or two” or 
even “one” child, while those who consider themselves economically secure are more 
likely to intend to have “two or three” or “three” children. This variation across egalitarian 
couples based on their perception of economic insecurity is striking. In contrast, the “two-
child norm” is more clearly dominant among less egalitarian couples, regardless of whether 
or not they perceive economic insecurity. By examining the variation in fertility intentions 
among egalitarian couples, the complexities produced for them by Spain’s dualistic labour 
market and modest state support for childrearing come into sharper focus. 
Fertility reasoning among economically insecure gender-egalitarian couples  
Nearly all interviewees in the more gender-egalitarian couples state that both partners 
should achieve some stability in their careers before the couple proceeds to a first birth. 
This contrasts with interviewees in less gender-egalitarian couples, who stress the 
importance of financial stability before proceeding to a first child but without necessarily 
mentioning women’s labour market position.  
Without secure jobs for both partners, many egalitarian couples seem to be engaged 
in a waiting game when it comes to having children. Arantxa and her partner, both 28 years 
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old, are an example. Although she trained as a nutritionist, Arantxa held a temporary job in 
telemarketing at the time of the interview. Her partner was an unemployed nurse. When 
asked about the conditions necessary to have their first child, Arantxa stressed the 
importance of ‘having more stability. He needs a job and I need a job… ,’ adding ‘the job I 
have now is not very secure.’ She and her partner intend to have two children but only after 
securing stable jobs. Given the constraints of the Spanish labour market, Arantxa even goes 
so far as to say that they might leave Spain and look for jobs abroad before having children. 
She explains that her partner is studying English and they are aware that there is a shortage 
of nurses in London. ‘So when he finishes his unemployment benefits…well, I have one 
foot in unemployment, so perhaps we will try to move to England.’  
Rebeca is another example of a female interviewee in an egalitarian but 
economically insecure couple. Both she and her partner are currently unemployed. While 
Rebeca, who is 26, would like to have two children, she thinks it is likely they will only 
have one because of the difficult labour market. In discussing the conditions for having 
their first child, she says: ‘First of all… well, we need to be sure about it psychologically. 
But above all we need to be economically secure—to each have a good job, to have 
stability—both of us.’  
Manuel is a 30 year old male interviewee in a gender-egalitarian partnership who 
also mentions economic insecurity as a possible obstacle to having children. He has 
considerable stability in his research job but his partner, who is 29, is in a temporary job 
with which she feels dissatisfied. Manuel says that he personally feels ready to have a child 
but they are waiting until his partner feels more secure in the labour market. Although he 
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would like to have three or four children, he thinks it more likely that they will have two. 
As he states: ‘In our case, the most important thing is whether my partner wants to move 
forward to have a child. I have told her that whenever she wants, whenever she feels ready 
and considers it to be the right moment, let’s go ahead. I think we can afford it now, but it 
will depend on when she feels fulfilled in other aspects. She wants to wait.’ 
Manuel’s case raises the issue of whether female partners’ desire to become 
established in the labour market is purely based on an economic rationale or also includes 
other motivations. In the context of a society where gender egalitarianism is more and more 
the norm, the female interviewees in many of the more egalitarian couples mention 
motivations such as autonomy and fulfilment that go beyond the economic. These suggest 
that being a dual-earner couple in the Spanish context has an ideological as well as an 
economic rationale. Likewise, the male interviewees in many egalitarian couples express 
recognition of such desires on the part of their partner.  
The three cases mentioned so far—Arantxa, Rebeca, and Manuel—all represent 
interviewees in egalitarian couples who perceive economic insecurity as an obstacle to 
fertility plans. All are childless so far. Their reasoning about fertility encompasses wanting 
both partners to become established in the labour market before proceeding to parenthood. 
In fact, the large majority of economically insecure egalitarian interviewees were childless 
at the time of the interview. 
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Fertility reasoning among economically secure egalitarian couples 
Economically secure egalitarian interviewees were evenly divided between the childless 
and those with one child. Among those who already had a child, another aspect of the 
Spanish context comes into play: the difficulty of achieving work-life balance, especially 
given that public childcare spaces are limited, private childcare is expensive, and Spanish 
childcare leave is unpaid. Many interviewees see a reduction in work hours on both the 
mother’s and father’s part as highly desirable when children are young. But the value they 
place on both members of the couple remaining employed translates into a daily time 
squeeze and the feeling that additional help in housework and/or childcare is necessary. 
Pablo exemplifies interviewees who stress the difficulties of work-life balance as the main 
reason for delaying the transition to a second child. Both he and his partner reduced their 
working hours substantially during the first year after their daughter was born. Pablo is a 33 
years old self-employed and works from home. He does more housework and childcare 
than his partner, who is the higher earner in the couple and she is 31. He describes the time 
required by childrearing as follows: ‘Our daughter is two years old and needs us constantly. 
She is not independent in any respect, and we would not be able to find time to take care of 
another child in the same way we have taken care of her. No, literally it cannot fit into our 
schedule…within the 24 hours of a day, another baby or small child would not fit. Now we 
understand what this means. Before, it was very abstract, but now it is very concrete’ 
[laughter]. 
Many interviewees in egalitarian couples who do not perceive economic insecurity 
strive to achieve work-family balance by outsourcing some housework, especially the more 
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arduous tasks such as house cleaning. Interviewees’ narratives suggest that by doing this, 
the couple experiences less conflict and can more easily achieve an equilibrium for other 
tasks that need to be done. Some interviewees say that by outsourcing housework they can 
maximize the time spent with their partner and family. Childcare strategies among 
interviewees in the most egalitarian couples are diverse. In some cases both partners plan to 
reduce their working hours, while in others both plan to continue working full-time but to 
adjust their schedules. A number of male interviewees state that their partner will reduce 
her working hours and that they themselves have a flexible work schedule and will not need 
to reduce their own work hours. (This may or may not be accurate, as few female 
interviewees mentioned work flexibility on the part of their partners.)  
In sum, our interviewees’ fertility planning seems to be facilitated or hindered by 
their egalitarianism depending on their level of perceived economic insecurity. The first 
expectation we outlined—that the positive influence of gender-role egalitarianism on 
fertility plans will prevail even when individuals feel economically insecure—is thus not 
borne out. Instead, egalitarian couples’ prioritization of a stable job for both men and 
women—a scarce commodity in Spain’s insider-outsider labour market—appears to lead 
many such couples who are economically insecure to hesitate moving forward with their 
fertility plans. Another of our expectations was that once both partners in more egalitarian 
couples are stably employed, their egalitarianism leads them to both be willing to reduce 
their work hours in order to participate in childrearing. Manuel and a number of others in 
our data provide support for this expectation. But whether or not their fertility intentions are 
positively affected seems to be an open question. Why? Having fought and won the 
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difficult battle of securing stable jobs in Spain’s bifurcated labour market, highly 
egalitarian couples face a second battle: the one posed by an inadequate parental leave 
system and a shortage of public childcare. Unpaid leave is available but obviously leads to 
short-term loss of income, and thus needs to be utilized judiciously. In exacerbating the 
time squeeze highly egalitarian couples feel between employment and childrearing, it can 
lead couples to express hesitation about having another child. This is brought into sharper 
relief when we contrast it with the counter-example of less egalitarian couples.  
Fertility reasoning among less gender-egalitarian couples 
Compared to the more egalitarian interviewees in our sample, the fertility intentions of 
interviewees in less egalitarian couples vary little according to the perception of economic 
insecurity or not. Most intend to have two children, and some intend to have “two or three.”  
Abril is a female interviewee in a less egalitarian couple with one child. She is 27 
years old, unemployed, and does most of the housework and childcare. Abril perceives 
economic insecurity as a fertility obstacle but nevertheless has the intention to have two 
children. A key difference between Abril on the one hand and interviewees in economically 
insecure but more egalitarian couples is that Abril is less concerned about having a stable 
full-time job. She states that she currently does not feel pressure to actively look for a job. 
When asked whether she would like to be a stay-at-home mother Abril rejects the idea, 
saying ‘I don’t want to be a “trophy wife.”’ But on the other hand, she is not seriously 
thinking of working full-time. As she puts it, ‘I would like to work, but also to stay with my 
daughter.’ When the interviewer follows up by asking ‘If you had a job, what kind of job 
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would it be?’ Abril replies, ‘A part-time job, so that I could spend part-time at home and 
part-time outside the home.’ Abril’s case illustrates that in contrast to more egalitarian 
interviewees, those in less-egalitarian couples are more apt to assume that the mother will 
adapt her work life while the father continues working full-time. Women in less gender 
egalitarian couples also generally say they cannot expect their partner to reduce his working 
hours (i.e. take part-time unpaid leave) after becoming a parent. In a sense, these couples in 
our highly-educated urban sample come the closest to fitting the male-breadwinner model.  
Conclusion  
This paper has examined how the interaction between couples’ gender egalitarianism and 
perceived economic insecurity influences the family formation plans of young highly-
educated partnered adults in urban Spain. In doing so, we aim to make a theoretical 
contribution by bringing together two substantial literatures in low-fertility research: gender 
equity theory and the empirical literature on economic insecurity. We also bring to bear the 
strengths of qualitative research in accessing individuals’ explanation of the reasoning they 
use to make decisions and the conditions they consider as important (DiMaggio 2014). 
Consistent with the literature on Spanish fertility, the majority of interviewees in 
our sample raise economic insecurity as an obstacle to their fertility plans. The majority of 
interviewees also fit our characterization of being quite gender egalitarian in their attitudes 
and behaviours. But these two dimensions interact in complex ways to influence fertility 
plans. More gender-egalitarian interviewees express interest in both members of the couple 
being stably employed in order to plan for children; when they do have such economic 
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security, such interviewees appear more likely to state an intention for two or even three 
children than gender-egalitarian interviewees who perceive economic instability. However, 
in order for gender egalitarianism to “fulfil its promise” of increasing fertility, our interview 
data suggest that institutional support is important. Our findings are consistent with 
McDonald’s emphasis on the importance of gender egalitarianism within couples as well as 
an institutional environment that supports dual-earner couples. Our qualitative data 
illustrate how Spain falls short in the institutional domain, as stably-employed dual-earner 
egalitarian couples wrestle with decisions about unpaid childcare leave and about balancing 
the dual commodities of income and time.   
On the other hand, the fertility intentions of interviewees in less egalitarian couples 
are somewhat more centred on the two-child norm common across Europe (Sobotka and 
Beaujouan 2014). With less concern for the female partner’s stable employment, such 
couples seem less likely to limit their intentions to “one or two” children but also less likely 
to stretch to an intention of “two or three.” The overall level of gender egalitarianism in 
Spain and the climate of economic uncertainty mean that women’s employment is valued 
even among these couples, but at the same time they are more likely to assume women’s 
availability to be full-time or near-full-time caregivers when children are under three years 
old.  
 While in-depth interviews provide a window into individuals’ reasoning that 
quantitative data cannot, there are also important limitations of our analysis. Obviously our 
sample size is too small to either permit generalization or to go beyond suggesting the 
complexity of the relationships between gender egalitarianism, economic insecurity, and 
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fertility. Rather, we hope to stimulate future research by raising issues that have neither 
been fully theorized nor empirically tested. Our interviews provide suggestive evidence for 
the positive influence on young highly-educated adults’ fertility plans of gender 
egalitarianism and institutional support for dual-earner couples, and also demonstrate the 
constraining influence of insider-outsider labour markets such as Spain’s.  
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Figure 1. Unemployment rate for 25-34-year olds, 1970-2014: Selected OECD countries 
Source: OECD Stats (www.stats.oecd.org). 
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Figure 2. Unemployment rate for 25-34 year olds with tertiary education (2014): Selected 
OECD countries 
 
Source: OECD Stats (www.stats.oecd.org).  
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Appendix. Interviewee Characteristics 
 
ID Sex 
Age (male 
partner/ 
female 
partner) 
Family 
formation 
stage 
Gender 
egalitarian 
category 
Ideal 
fertility 
Intended 
fertility 
Couple’s economic arrangement 
Net household 
income 
(Euros/month) 
Couples who perceive economic insecurity as an obstacle for fertility 
Arantxa F 28/28 Childless More egalitarian 2 2 Male unemployed 1685 
Belén F 29/26 Childless More egalitarian 3 3 Dual-earner (equal earners) 3000 
Diego M 28/29 Childless More egalitarian 2 2 Dual-earner (male higher earner) 2667 
Eduardo M 24/25 Childless More egalitarian No ideal 1-2 Dual-earner (female higher earner) 1780 
Elsa F 33/35 One-child More egalitarian 2 2 Male unemployed 1560 
Eulalia F 32/33 Childless More egalitarian 3 2-3 Dual-earner (unknown salaries) Missing 
Federico M 26/30 Childless More egalitarian 3 1-2 Female unemployed 2600 
Javier M 26/26 Childless More egalitarian 3 2 Dual-earner (equal earners) 2750 
Julián M 33/34 Childless More egalitarian No ideal 2 Female unemployed 1600 
Manuel M 30/29 Childless More egalitarian 3-4 2 Dual-earner (male higher earner) 1833 
Paula F 30/28 Childless More egalitarian 2 2 Male unemployed 1900 
Pedro M 34/36 One-child More egalitarian 2 1 Dual-earner (male higher earner) 3000 
Rebeca F 25/26 Childless More egalitarian 2 1 Both unemployed 1183 
Teresa F 30/30 One-child More egalitarian 3-4 3-4 Dual-earner (male higher earner) 2700 
Tomás M 33/29 One-child More egalitarian 2 2 Dual-earner (equal earners) 2200 
Victor M 32/28 Childless More egalitarian 2 1 Male unemployed 2500 
Abril F 31/27 One-child Less egalitarian 2 2 Female unemployed 1920 
Ainhoa F 31/33 Childless Less egalitarian 3-4 2 Dual-earner (female higher earner) 7500 
Clara F 25/24 One-child Less egalitarian 3 2 Dual-earner (unknown salaries) Missing 
Daniela F 30/31 Childless Less egalitarian 2 2 Female unemployed Missing 
Elisa F 31/28 One-child Less egalitarian 3 2-3 Female unemployed 1500 
Margarita F 34/33 One-child Less egalitarian 2-3 2 Dual-earner (male higher earner) Missing 
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Mercedes F 31/29 Childless Less egalitarian 3 2 Dual-earner (unknown salaries) Missing 
Pamela F 38/27 Childless Less egalitarian 2 1 Dual-earner (male higher earner) Missing 
Ruth F 28/26 Childless Less egalitarian 2 2 Dual-earner (equal earners) 2000 
Alejandro M 29/30 Childless Less egalitarian 3 2-3 Female unemployed 2560 
Cristian M 33/31 One-child Less egalitarian 2-3 2 Dual-earner (unknown salaries) Missing 
Ignacio M 25/25 Childless Less egalitarian Insecure Insecure Dual-earner (female higher earner) 1650 
Jacobo M 29/35 One-child Less egalitarian 2-3 2-3 Dual-earner (equal earners) 1000 
Couples who do not perceive economic insecurity as an obstacle for fertility 
Alberto M 30/29 One-child More egalitarian 2-3 2-3 Dual-earner (male higher earner) Missing 
Alfonso M 34/29 Childless More egalitarian 2-3 2-3 Dual-earner (equal earners) 4500 
Bruno M 27/26 Childless More egalitarian 3 3 Dual-earner (equal earners) 4200 
Cristina F 37/33 One-child More egalitarian 4 2 Female unemployed 3400 
Daniel M 35/35 One-child More egalitarian 2-3 2 Dual-earner (equal earners) 4750 
Felipe M 32/33 One-child More egalitarian 2 Insecure Dual-earner (female higher earner) Missing 
Guillermo M 35/36 One-child More egalitarian 2 2 Dual earner (unknown salaries) Missing 
Joaquín M 30/28 Childless More egalitarian 2 1 Dual-earner (equal earners) 5583 
Julio M 32/30 Childless More egalitarian 1-2 1-2 Dual-earner (male higher earner) 5417 
Pablo M 33/31 One-child More egalitarian No ideal 2 Dual-earner (female higher earner) 3750 
Raúl M 31/30 Childless More egalitarian 2 2 Dual-earner (male higher earner) 3467 
Ana F 36/34 One-child Less egalitarian 2-3 2 Female unemployed 6000 
Antonio M 34/33 One-child Less egalitarian 3 2 Female unemployed Missing 
Imma F 31/31 One-child Less egalitarian 2-3 2 Male unemployed 4583 
Inés F 34/33 One-child Less egalitarian 2 2 Dual-earner (female higher earner) 2400 
Juan M 29/29 One-child Less egalitarian 4-5 4 Dual-earner (male higher earner) 7083 
Oscar M 27/31 One-child Less egalitarian 2-3 2-3 Female unemployed (student) 1083 
Sofía F 31/29 One-child Less egalitarian 3 2-3 Dual-earner (male higher earner) 2995 
 
 
